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SECOND





The purpose of this article is to survey the changes, both legislative
and judicial, which have taken place in the field of Florida administrative
law during the past two years.1 Of necessity the range of administrative
activity encompasses the whole area of legislative power and executive
implementation; and the myriad substantive rules and regulations of the
various administrative bodies cover a field as broad in scope as that of
government itself. No attempt can be made here to deal with specific
agencies or specific rules except insofar as they exemplify the more general
considerations usually embraced under the heading Administrative Law.
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
Administrative law for years has suffered from the belated and grudg-
ing recognition accorded it by bench and bar, and perhaps the neurotic
inconsistencies it from time to time exhibits may best be understood in
terms of a neglected childhood and an uninhibited adolescence. But thc
fact remains that today the administrative aspects of government have
more immediate impact upon our people than does the traditional execu-
* Assistant Professor of Law.
1. Considered in this survey are cases reported in 66 So.2d through and including
those in 81 So.2d together with legislation enacted during the 1955 session of the Florida
Legislature,
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live, judicial and legislative triunvirate in and of itself. Governmnct Iny
administrative agency is no longer the lusty infant of the ninctccn twenties,
nor the precocious adolescent giant of the thirties. Rather, it is a veteran
of the wars, a sober and useful partner of its elder brethren, and it is time
a regular and well-defined place was madc for it in the community of
our legal institutions. The most important activity in this field by the
1955 Session of the Florida Legislature has becn directed toward the crea-
tion of such a place.
Control of Administrative Agencies
The first step toward recognition of the maturity of Florida administra-
tive law was the enactment of chapter 29777, Laws of Fla. 1955. This act
provides for the filing of rules and regulations of administrative bodies
with the Secretary of State, and for dissemination by him of this informa-
tion to the interested public.
Hitherto, the onlv source of such information was the agency itself,
and, although changes in rules might be published, unless the attorney
dealing with the particular agency had had considerable experience, it was
always possible that through no fault of his own he might act in ignorance,
both to his own and his client's detriment. This act should go far to remove
the aura of mystery which permeates the administrative area. It pins re-
sponsibility on the agency to act in the open, and the agency's failure to
do so will result in no action at all. After January 1, 1956, no regulation
or rule of any administrative body which affects the general public will be
effective until 15 days after it has been filed with the Secretary of State.
In an emergency a regulation may be made effective within a shorter period,
but only upon affidavit setting forth the emergency, and then only as to
persons having actual knowledge of the regulation.
This chapter also provides for registration with the Secretary of State
of the name and address of every chairman and secretary of every state
agency, and makes such registration conclusive upon the agency in any
determination of the validity of service of process.
Chapter 29777 enacts in substance one of the principal sections of
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act.2 If it is properly adminis-
tered it should represent a decided step forward in the development of state
administrative law and may possibly foreshadow the adoption of other
provisions of the Model Act.
Another legislative change, although affecting internal management
only, which further raises the level of state agency responsibility is chapter
2. '1 he Act was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1946. For the full text of the act and an analysis and critique, see
Schwartz, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 7 RUTGERs L.REv. 431 (1953).
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29902, Laws of la. 1955. This act provides that all departmUents and
branches of state govcrnmcnt, except the legislature and the Legislative
Reference Council and Bureau, shall comply with a uniform accounting
system to be prescribed by the State Auditor.
Creation and Abolition of Administrative Agencies
The 1955 Legislature abolished the Florida State Advertising Com-
mission and the Florida State Improvement Commission and transferred
the functions of these two agencies to a new body, the Florida Develop-
ment Commission.3
Chapter 29831,4 effective the same date, delegates new duties to the
now defunct Improvement Commission, an error which probably invalidates
this chapter relating to the financing of state office buildings.
Chapter 298335 creates the Florida Avocado and Lime Commission,
with broad powers for the regulation and taxation of these industries. The
general purpose of the act is to increase consumption of these products
through advertising, but incidental regulation is considerable and spelled
out clearly in a well drafted piece of legislation. However, the provision
for publication of rules and regulationsO seems unnecessary in view of the
filing requirements of chapter 29777, supra.
By another act' the State Board of Law Examiners is abolished, and
the regulation of admissions to the Florida Bar is placed under the control
of the Supreme Court. This action seems doubly appropriate in view of
the legislative indiscretion considered and upheld in Barr v. WattsO which
is discussed in greater detail hereafter.
Changes in Scope and Powers of Administrative Agencies
Matters ranging from a reduction of the license fee for baby sitter
agencies9 to a broad revision of Workmen's Compensation 0 occupied much
of the energies of the 1955 Legislature. Most of such matters are beyond
the scope of this article and should be considered under their own distinct
heads. Wide changes were wrought in the field of insurance law'. The
merit system previously in operation was considerably extended and a State
Personnel Board was created.'2 The authority of the Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission was extended to auto transportation brokers.' 3  Con-
3. Laws of Fla., c. 29788 (1955).
4. Laws of Fla., c. 29831 (1955).
5. Laws of Fla., c. 29833 (1955).
6, Id. § 17.
7. Laws of Fla., c. 29796 (1955).
8. 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1953)
9. Laws of Fla., c. 29943 (1955).
10. Laws of Fla., c. 29778 (1955).
11. 56 chapters of the 1955 session laws are concemed with inurance.
12. Laws of Fla., c. 29933 (1955).
13. Laws of Fi2., c. 29787 (1955).
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siderablc change has been made in the Board of Dental Examiners.'4
These and many other changes too numerous to mention are typical of
the increasing tendency of legislatures everywhere to broaden and perfect
the administrative machinery which more and more translates the results
of legislative deliberation into effective action.
RECENT COURT DECISIONS
During the period under consideration the Florida Supreme Court
reaffirmed many old principles and on several occasions acted to settle the
law in doubtful situations. We shall consider here only those cases whose
principles might be applicable to administrative law generally, leaving aside
determinations peculiar to any one particular agency.
Legislative Standards and Administrative Discretion
The trend has been toward upholding broader delegations of discre-
tionary power and a refusal to inquire into the basis for discretionary action.
In a series of decisions affecting various agencies and diverse subject matter
the Supreme Court has firmly reiterated its position that it will not disturb
results of administrative discretion where the use of that discretion was
not clearly in error.15  In other words, the court will not substitute its
discretion for that of the agency.
However, where the agency has abused its discretion, or where the
administrative action has been beyond the range of delegated power, the
court has been quick to act. In Lee v. Delnar'6 an attempt by the Real
Estate Commission to refuse licenses to part-time real estate salesmen was
held to exceed the authority granted by the Legislature. Tile Commission's
action was based on the general rulemaking power delegated to it,17 but
the Court pointed out that such power is limited to regulation in the public
interest and cannot be construed as an unlimited grant. In declaring the
Commission's resolution void, the Court implied that upon constitutional
grounds such regulation might be beyond the scope of the legislature itself.
Similarly, in Florida Tel. Corp. v. Carter,' an order of the Railroad
and Public Utilities Commission denying a rate increase because of the
inadequate service rendered by the petitioner was held an arbitrary act
exceeding the statutory grant. The order was quashed and the Commis-
sion directed to grant the increase. Penalties for inadequate service must
14. Laws of Fla., c. 29882 (1955).
15 Pirman v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 78 So.2d 718 (Fla. 1955)
(location of a bridge); Hunter v. Solomon, 75 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1954) (transfer and
relocation of a liquor license); State v. Florida State Improvement Comm n, 75 So.2d
I (Fla. 1954)(Iocation of a bridge); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Carter, 66 So.2d 217
(Fla. 1953) (certificate of public convenience and necessity).
16. 66 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1953).
17. FLA. STAT. § 475.05 (1951).
18. 70 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1954).
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be considered in a separate proceeding. There is no statutory authority
for rate regulation based upon quality of service performed.
Two more cases concerned with the granting of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the same Commission also found that the
Commission had acted beyond the power delegated to it by statute.
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mack, 19 involved a consideration of FLA. STAT. §
323.04(3), which limits the grant of a new certificate to those cases in
which "the existing certificate holders . . . fail to provide service which may
reasonably be required." In this case the applicant was a new shipper
desiring to carry liquefied petroleum gas, a product not previously shipped
from the area in question. On certiorari the Court quashed the order
granting the certificate and required that existing certificate holders be
given an opportunity to provide the service. The action of the Commis-
sion was held to be in violation of the clear language of the statute. In
Tamiami Trail Tours v. Carter,20 the same question was presented. After
some difficulty, the Court, upon rehearing, reaffirmed the Redwing decision.
Of perhaps greater importance was Barr v. Walts,2 1 which is possibly
rendered moot in the particular field by transfer of control of the Bar from
the Legislature to the Supreme Court. None the less it contains the seeds
of future controversy in the area of administrative law generally. Here,
the State Board of Law Examiners, confronted with special legislation de-
signed to permit one favored individual to take the bar examination without
meeting the qualifications of other applicants, believed such legislation
unconstitutional, and withheld permission. In a mandamus proceeding
the Supreme Court compelled the board to comply with the act and laid
down the principle that an administrative agency may not determine con-
stitutionality, a purely judicial function, but must put all qualms aside and
blindly carry out its statutory mission. The court conceded that in certain
cases, where the expenditure of state funds might be made under an un-
constitutional statute, the agency might be justified in refusing to act; but
in this case no such tender conscience was permitted.
In the view of the Court the act was constitutional, and the agency's
suspicions were unfounded. It seems, however, that where a matter of
such importance is involved, and where the act, even if constitutional, is
such a perversion of the purposes for which the agency was created, the
agency should be permitted to question the validity of the act and defer
action until the court can settle the question. Justice Terrell's dissent
seems far the sounder point of view. Perhaps, despite the sweeping
language of the majority, this case can be construed as a simple determina-
tion of constitutionality and not as a requirement that administrators be
unwilling accomplices to any and all legislative usurpation.
19. 73 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1954).
20. 80 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1955).
21. 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1953).
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Othcr decisions sustained broad grants of power by the Legislature.
In Levine v. Hamilton,22 involving the constitutionality of the extensive
powers delegated to the Board of Pharmacy to fix the scope of the examina-
tion of applicants, it was held that despite the language of the statute, 3
it must be interpreted in the light of the purposes it was designed to achieve.
A consideration of the statute as a whole indicated that the legislative intent
was that the examination be confined to matters relating to pharmacy. Thus
construed, the statute is constitutional. Any attempt by the Board to
examine on unrelated matters would therefore be merely an effort to act
beyond the range of delegated authority and void. Relying on the principle
of construction that where a statute is susceptible of two interpretations
the constitutional one shall prevail, the Court upheld the act and reduced
the question from one of constitutionality to one of mere administrative
discretion.
Perhaps the limit of discretion conferred by a statute24 couched in
modest language is to be found in Fisher v. Schumacher.2 Words which
merely seem to empower the State Board of Optometry to regulate mis-
leading and untruthful advertising were used to sustain a code of ethics
for optometrists which regulated such minute details as the size of window
signs and the format of professional cards. The court sustained the regula-
tion as being proper and necessary and within the discretion of the Board.
Justice Drew dissented on the ground that no legislative standards were
anywhere set up in the act, and that no authority for such regulation had
been delegated. As in most such cases the decision depends upon a personal
interpretation of the implied powers incidental to regulation generally.
The majority in this case was extremely liberal.
Two interesting cases involving the propriety of discretionary action
and also the question of estoppel against an administrative body are Bregar
v. Britton,20 and Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden.2" The Bregar ease
was a suit in equity contesting the validity of a zoning regulation. The
plaintiff obtained a zoning change permitting him to construct a drive-in
movie, only to be informed, after he had expended some $28,000 in reliance
upon the board's action, that there had been a complaint and that there
would be a re-hearing. At the re-hearing the board rescinded its previous
resolution and re-established the original zoning requirement, preventing
the plaintiff from making the use of the property which he desired. The
Court held that the board's latest action was purely arbitrary; an abuse of
discretion; and further, that in view of the board's knowledge of plaintiff's
22. 66 So.2d 266 (F12. 1953).
23. FLA. STAT. § 465.02(1) (1951).
24. FLA. STAT. §§ 463.11, 463.14(1) (1953).
25. 72 So.2d 804 (Fla 1954).
26, 75 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1954).
27. 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
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reliance and expenditure, the board was estopped to reconsider its prior
action.
In the Gladden case28 the Court was concerned with determining the
effective date of a statute20 barring compensation under certain circum-
stances to farmers whose animals were destroyed by the Board. The act
provided that the effective date should be August 4; however, the Board
by regulation delayed the effective date until August 15. Gladden, subse-
quent to August 4, engaged in activities which would have denied him com-
pensation, but by August 15 he had mended his ways. The Board examined
Gladden's livestock and found it necessary to destroy a large number of
hogs, They then denied him compensation on the ground that he had
violated the act. The Board contended that its regulation deferring the
effective date of the act was invalid and a usurpation of the legislative
function. The Court held, however, that the regulation was proper and
necessary, and therefore valid, and further, that in any event, the Board,
because of Gladden's reliance upon its regulation, was estopped to deny
validity.
The implication from these cases is that in certain cases legislative
standards may be broadened by estoppel, and discretion upheld even though
beyond the reach of the legislative yardstick.
Several other decisions were banded down affecting the scope of
administrative activity in the light of the empowering statute.8 0 The
constitutionality of Chapter 323 of the Florida Statutes, establishing con-
trol over motor carriers by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commis-
sion, was again upheld, this time in a case involving regulation of "trip
lease" carriers. 8' It was also held that no statutory authority was necessary
to enjoin the operation of a nursery home whose operator has failed to obtain
a license from the State Welfare Board.32 This would seem subject to in-
junction as a public nuisance regardless of statutory authority. In general,
it may be said that despite the few restrictive cases discussed above, and
excepting the dictum of Barr v. Watts, the attitude of the court has been
a liberal one in defining the limits of administrative discretionary action.
Notice, Nature and Conduct of the Hearing
Lawyers as a class have long been suspicious of administrative hear-
ings,33 fearing, and with some justification, that expediency may triumph
28. Ibid.
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 585.48-585.59 (1953).
30. Lambert v. State, 77 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1955); Ex rel. Kaplan v. Dee, 77
So.2d 768 (Fla. 1955); Weber v. Florida State Board of Optometry, 73 So.2d 408
(Fla. 1954).
31. Stewart v. Mack, 66 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1953).
32. State Dep't of Public Welfare v. Bland, 66 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1953).
33. Elliott, Trends in Administrative Law, 17 NEv. STATE B.J. I (1952). Dean
Elliott designates four stages in the history of the Bar's attitude toward administrative
agencies; first, from 1900 to 1920, the "If you don't notice them, they'll go away"
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over due process. Administrative procedure is concededly not that of the
common law, but it must none-the-less be according to due process. The
recent decisions of the Florida Supreme Court indicate a healthy awareness
of the delicate line separating administrative necessity from abuse of con-
stitutional safeguards, and have attempted to protect the latter without
unduly burdening the administrative process.
Notice
In State ex rel. Bergin Y. Dunne,8 relator sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the Board of Plumbing Examiners of Coral Gables to reinstate
his master plumber's license which had been revoked by the Board without
notice of hearing being given him. The Board replied, admitted that the
license had been revoked without notice or hearing, but claimed that it
had been obtained by fraud and that relator had never taken or passed the
examination which was a condition precedent to the issuance of the license.
Relator elected to stand on the pleadings and moved for the issuance of a
peremptory writ. The majority of the Court held that relator's reliance on
the pleadings constituted an admission that he had obtained his license
by fraud and that "a writ of mandamus will not be allowed in a case of
doubtful right; .. . it will not lie to compel the parties against whom it is
directed to do a vain or useless thing."35 The writ was denied. Roberts,
C. J. dissented on the ground that any admission made by relator was for
the purpose of the motion only, and, as in a demurrer, was an admission
made solely to test the sufficiency of the opposing party's pleading. This
case turns on the nature of the admission and is properly classified as
setting forth a rule of procedural rather than substantive law, but it is sub-
mitted that despite the nature of the admission, the relator was entitled to
a hearing. The ordinance under which the Board functioned3a required
a hearing, and the action of the Board appears arbitrary and not consonant
with due process.
Conduct of the Hearing
In Coleman v. Watts,3t a more satisfactory result was obtained. Peti-
tioner, an applicant for admission as an attorney at law, was denied per-
mission to take the bar examination by the State Board of Law Examiners
as being morally unfit. He had appeared before the Board, submitted to
an inquisition, and had repeatedly asked what charges had been made
against him. No evidence of immoral activity was submitted to the Board
in his presence, nor was he ever informed in what way he was deemed unfit.
stage; second, from 1920 to 1935, the "viewing with alarm" or "exorcism by anathema"
period; then the period of proposed reform, 1935 to 1940; and the present stage which
is described as the period of "reform from within" whose philosophy has been "If you
can't lick 'em, join 'er."
34. 71 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1954).
35. Id. at 749.
36. City of Coral Cables, Ord. 669, § 12, (1950).
37. 81 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1955).
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The conclusion of the Court was that the Board must have acted upon
undisclosed information. The Court held this to be a denial of due process
and that the applicant was entitled to know the charges against him, and
that if such charges were not disclosed the Board was powerless to reject
his application. "An administrative body, no matter how broad its dis-
cretion, must show, when its orders are properly challenged in the courts,
that its conclusions are based upon record evidence and do not rest solely
upon confidential information of which the applicant is not apprised, and
as to which the administrative body gives such credence as to permit it to
override a complete denial of derogatory implications by an applicant when
he is questioned."38
That the rule of the preceding case is limited to the agency's exercise
of its judicial powers and does not apply when it is acting solely in an ad-
ministrative capacity is indicated by Seaboard A. L. Ry. v, Cay,3 19 wherein
plaintiff's petition for certiorari was denied. This was a proceeding against
the State Comptroller and the Railroad Assessment Board attacking the
validity of tax assessments levied upon the plaintiff's property. The Board
conducted a hearing to determine the amount of the assessment, and at
the hearing the only evidence submitted was that of the plaintiff. None-
the-less, the Board at a later meeting valued plaintiff's property at a figure
far in excess of plaintiff's valuation, and in fact adopted a valuation previous-
ly announced by the Comptroller and not sustained by any evidence. The
Court in sustaining the action of the Board quoted with approval the
language of the Circuit Judge: "'The assessment of property by an ad-
ministrative officer is the performance of an administrative duty, and
contemplates that the officer bring to bear upon the problem an informed
judgment of his own. It thus differs materially from a judicial proceeding
in which a Court weighs the evidence before it and determines the facts
based upon the weight of the evidence as distinguished from the exercise of
the personal or individual judgment of the court.' ",0
Although more illustrative of the practice of particular agencies than
indicative of administrative procedure generally, two cases were decided
recently which are of some interest. In White v. Lynn Foundry and Mach.
Co.,4' a workmen's compensation proceeding, the finding of the deputy
commissioner that there had been no such wilfull violation of the speed
laws as to preclude recovery by the claimant was reversed by the full com-
mission which dismissed the claim. It was held that the full Commission
had erred. "It is settled law that the Industrial Commission should not
reverse the findings of fact made by a Deputy Commissioner unless it ap-
pears that those findings are clearly erroneous, and that they are not sup-
38. Id. at 652, 653.
39. 74 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1954).
40. 74 So.2d 569, 571, 572 (Fla. 1954).
41. 74 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1954).
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ported by the evidence."42 In Taniamni Trail Tours v. Carter, discussed
above under Legislative Standards, an incidental ground urged by the peti-
tioners was that the Railroad Commission had overruled findings of fact
made by the trial examiner which were adequately supported by evidence
in the record. Although not relied upon in the final decision upon rehearing,
the action of the commission on this point was upheld, and the court dis-
tinguished the different practice before the Industrial Commission by point-
ing out that there, the deputy commissioner, by statute, is made a trier of
the facts, and the action of the full Commission is in the nature of review;
whereas, before the Railroad Commission the trial examiner, if authorized
at all, is merely an administrative aid to the Commission, and the initial
determination is the action of the Commission itself.
Two other cases arising out of workmen's compensation proceedings
are Wheeler v. Hendry Corp. and Roberts v. Wofford Beach Hotel.44 In
the Wheeler case, certiorari was sought upon the ground that only two mem-
bers of the commission sat on the appeal; whereas the statute provides "the
full Commission shall consider the matter upon the record."45  Motion
to dismiss the petition was granted because no objection had been made at
the time of hearing and the present objection was deemed too late. The
Court expressly refused to determine whether action by but two members
of the Commission was valid or invalid, but, in view of the decision such
action is obviously not without jurisdiction. In the Roberts case, one ground
of appeal was that the deputy commissioner excluded as hearsay a report
by a nerve specialist of his examination of claimant. Such exclusion was
held not to be error. Although as a general rule administrative tribunals
are not bound by the common law rules of evidence, this case indicates that
at least in Florida the hearsay rule is applicable in an administrative hearing.
Nature of the Hearing
In hearings incidental to the exercise of the licensing power an ad-
ministrative agency exercises a function frequently termed "quasi judicial,"
and Florida has long recognized this activity as judicial in nature.48 A recent
decision of the Supreme Court reaffirms this position and further clarifies
the nature of this function. Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co.47 was an action
for libel and slander arising out of a hearing before the Insurance Commis-
sioner held to determine the plaintiff's fitness to become an insurance
agent. Defendants made certain derogatory statements at this hearing and
prior thereto which might have been libelous unless they were privileged.
It was held that the Commissioner's action in determining fitness of an
42. Id. at 541.
43. 70 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1954).
44. 67 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1953).
45. FLA. STAT. § 440,25(4) (1953).
46. Ex rel. Williams v. XWhitman, 116 Fla, 196, 150 So. 136 (1933), 156 So.
705 (1934).
47. 75 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1954).
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applicant was so much a judicial function that the same absolute privilege
existed at the administrative hearing as exists in a regular judicial proceed-
ing before a court.
Investigatory Powers
One of the principal differences between the duly constituted courts
and administrative agencies is the latter's power to investigate incidental to
the exercise of their other functions. That this power is broad and not
subject to the inhibitions imposed on law enforcement agencies generally
is exemplified in In re Smith48 where investigators for the Hotel Commis-
sion used threatening language and forced their way, without a search war-
rant, into a private room in a hotel in search of evidence of gambling. The
evidence obtained was admissible for the purpose of suspending the hotel
license, and the action of the investigators was upheld as a valid exercise of
the authority conferred by FLA. STAT. § 511.11 (1951), providing that the
Hotel Commissioner will inspect "at least annually" every hotel and that
he shall have access thereto "at any reasonable time." A strong dissent by
Dayton, J. on the ground that this action was in fact an unreasonable
search and seizure, and in violation of both state and federal constitutions,
bears careful reading. It is to be hoped that the Commission's activity
complained of here does not, by virtue of this decision, become the order
of the day for administrative investigators generally.
Judicial Review
The varieties of judicial review of administrative action are consider-
able. The creating statute may establish an appeal procedure, or, in the
absence of statute, review of administrative activity may be obtained by
use of one of the common law writs, by resort to equity, or by defense of
an action seeking to enforce the administrative order. Recent decisions
of the Florida Supreme Court have not been precedent smashing, but rather
have tended to clarify the details of procedure.
Administrative Prerequisites
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was adhered to
in two recent cases. In Atlantic C. L. Ry. v. Carter49 the petitioner sought
a writ of certiorari to review certain orders of the Railroad Commission which
were not to go into effect until six months after the date the orders were
entered. This action was brought before the effective date of the orders.
Hearings had been held by the agency prior to the adoption of the orders,
and no petition or motion was filed with the Commission for rehearing.
The orders provided for exemptions in certain cases, within the discretion
of the Commission. No application had been filed for exemption. The
Court held that the orders complained of were not final orders and thus
48. 74 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1954).
49. 66 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1953).
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were not subject to review by certiorari, and further that the petitioners had
not exhausted the administrative remedies available to them.
In Morrison v. Plotkin58 a pharmacist admitted to practice in New Jersey
sought a decree construing FLA. STAT. § 465.071(1) (1953) which sets forth
in rather broad terms the qualifications of applicants for examination.
Plaintiff had not requested permission to take the examination given by
the State Board of Pharmacy, nor had he applied for reciprocal registration
on the basis of his New Jersey registration. It was held that no issue was
presented. That as plaintiff had had no dealings with the Board he lacked
the prerequisites to any legal action, that he had not exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies. The bill was dismissed.
Statutory Prerequisites
Lipkin v. Roxy Cleaners"1 was a workmen's compensation proceeding.
Notice of appeal filed with the commission in Tallahassee failed to fix a
a return day as required by statute. 2 After time for appeal had passed,
claimant attempted to amend the notice to comply with the statute.
Claimant's appeal from an order of the board was dismissed by the circuit
court for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out
that failure to meet the statutory requirement was fatal. Today this action
would not be brought. The only method of review of orders of the Industrial
Commission now is by certiorari.5 3 However, this case is valid for our
purposes in that it indicates that statutory requirements with regard to
appeal are jurisdictional.
Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. CoP4 is a particularly interesting case to any-
one interested in the field of workmen's compensation as it elaborates upon
the statutory procedure and, to a certain degree, supersedes it. This
case considers the constitutionality of chapter 28241, Laws of Fla. 1953,
which abolished the right of appeal in workmen's compensation cases and
provided that such actions should be subject to review only by certiorari.
The statute was held constitutional. However, the statute provided that the
petition for certiorari must be filed within 30 days of the date of the mailing
of the challenged order. This would have resulted in a different time limit
for certiorari in these cases from that in all others, because Rule 28 of the
Supreme Court provides that the petition is timely if filed within 60 days.
To bring workmen's compensation cases into line with all other cases, the
Court disregarded the 30 day provision of the statute and amplified Rule 28
50. 77 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1955).
51. 67 So.2d 660 (Fla. 1953).
52. FLA. STAT. § 440.27(4)( 19511, incorrectly cited by the court as (1953).
53. Laws of Fa., c. 28241 (1953), amended FLA. STAT. § 440.27 (1951) by
abolishing appeal and making certiorari the only method of review of the commission's
orders.
54. 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954); See also American Airomotive Corp. v. Stutz, 72 So.2d
665 (Fla. 1954).
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to include specifically petitions for writs to the Industrial Commission."5
Further, the Court in this case enlarged the scope of common law certiorari
by extending to cases arising before the Industrial Commission the broader
scope of review previously granted to matters involving the Railroad Com.
mission.56 In the Wilson case the Court said, "Parties aggrieved by orders
of the Industrial Commission having been divested of any opportunity of
review by appeal, the only course open to them is certiorari. The procedure
by certiorari, that we are approving constitutes something less than appeal,
something more than certiorari."" t
Venue
A series of cases reaffinned the rule that where no emergency is present,
and where no constitutional right of the plaintiff is challenged, and no at-
tempt made to seize his property, proper venue for a suit against an adminis-
trative agency is in the county of the agency's residence.58
Nature of Administrative Action Generally
What is the effect of an intervening change in the law between the
time of administrative determination and the date of the eventual appeal?
Several workmen's compensation cases recently decided have some bearing
on this question. In Glass v. Miller,59 where the change was the result
of a judicial decision which was pending at the time the commission
heard the matter, it was held that if the change occurs before the
judgment is final, the cause will be remanded to the deputy commissioner
with directions to reevaluate his decision in the light of the change.
In Phillips v. West Palm Beach 0 where, after the original detennina-
tion by the commission, the statute was amended to broaden the scope
of recovery in the event of permanent partial disability, and claimant's
permanent partial disability did not occur until after the change, the Court
none the less affirmed the commission's later award based upon the prior
statute, holding that to apply the later statute would be to give it retroactive
effect in violation of U.S. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 10. In Plymouth Citrus Products
Co-op v. Williamson, 6' the deputy commissioner, relying upon the then
current decisions of the Supreme Court, denied recovery. After time to
appeal had expired, a new decision of the Supreme Court was handed
55. FL., SUP. CT. RULE 28 (e) and (c) (1949), superseded by FLA. Sup. CT. RULE
16 (1955) effective March 15, 1955; Laws of Fla., c. 29778 (1955) conforms the
statute to the rule.
56. Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876
(1930); See also American Nat'l Bank v. Marks Lumber & Hdw. Co., 45 So.2d 336 (Fla.
1950).
57. Sutra note 54 at 665.
58. Larson v. Cooper, 75 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1954); Florida Real Estate Comm'n v.
Bodner, 75 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1954); Dowdy v. Lawton, 72 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1954);
McCarty v. Lichtenberg, 67 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1953).
59. 65 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1953).
60. 70 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1953).
61. 71 So.2d 162 (Fi2. 1954).
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down which would have allowed claimant's recovery. Claimant thereupon
brought a new action based upon the same facts, and the Commission
allowed the claim. Upon application for certiorari by the employer the
writ was granted. The Court held the original proceeding res judicata,
and implied that although an intervening statute might permit a redeter-
mination of the matter, an intervening decision could not.
In view of the Court's position in the Phillips case it seems doubtful
whether any distinction could validly be made between a statute and a
decision. In any event the holding of the Plymouth case that an administra-
tive determination once final should be res judicata seems supported by
common sense. Litigation must end sometime.
Where a statute provides that the administrative remedy is exclusive,
even though the parties are engaged in illegal activity expressly prohibited
by the statute, the sole remedy is the administrative one. In Winn-Lovett
Tampa, Inc. v. Murphree,62 it was held that although a minor was injured
while operating power driven equipment in violation of law, none the less
he was an employee, and his only action was under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. A writ of prohibition issued to the circuit court to prevent
a suit at law against the employer.
In State v. Murrell, a disbarment proceeding, the Court, in imposing
suspension upon the offending attorney, conditioned the length of sus-
pension upon the attorney's reimbursing the State Bar for expenses
incurred in prosecuting the action. To a challenge to certain items of
costs submitted by the Florida Bar the Court replied that this type of
action was not an adversary proceeding and that the reimbursement due
the Bar was not limited to legal costs. Despite the forum, this type of
action is essentially administrative.
CONCLUSION
The recent legislation, upon which we have already touched, indicates
the Legislature's awareness of the importance of Administrative Law in
Florida. The approach has been conservative, as it should be, and it may
be that the filing requirements of chapter 29777 alone will provide an
adequate control. However, it will be profitable to study the experience
of those states which have adopted, in toto, the Model Administrative
Procedure Act. It is possible that further standardization of administrative
procedure would be advisable, although the matter is at least debatable.
However, excess of control may stifle flexibility, the administrator's finest
contribution to modem government. The aim should be responsibility,
not regimentation.
62. 73 So.2d 287 Fla. 1954); See Note, 9 MtmMI L.- 111 (1954).
63. 74 So.ld 221 Fin. 1954); 76 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1,43.
